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Using non-parametric approaches, this study investigates the technical efficiencies of 
U.S. hospitals that have undergone horizontal mergers. Past studies have shown that hospital 
prices, hospital costs, quality of care provided, and consumer welfare are affected by these 
mergers. Theoretical studies on mergers propose potential gains from mergers. The results from 
these studies provide conflicting reports on the efficiencies of the merged hospitals. Hospitals 
merge in the anticipation of increasing market power by reducing operational expenses and 
expansion of services. However, many of these merged hospitals have filed for bankruptcy and 
have shut down in the years following the merger.  This points to the importance of analyzing the 
post-merger performance of hospitals. 
 The research question is to examine the impact of mergers on the hospitals using a two-
stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH) method. In the second 
stage, a Tobit regression model is used to determine the impact of hospital size, ownership, and 
urbanization levels on bootstrapped efficiency scores using the panel dataset for the years 2001-
2011. While existing studies analyze the merged entity that comprises both the acquirer hospitals 
and the target hospitals, this paper focuses primarily on the target hospital in the merger. Also, a 
larger pre/post-merger time span is analyzed to fully capture the technical efficiency changes due 
to the mergers. Further analyses include efficiency comparisons of merged hospitals of various 
sizes, ownership types, and urbanization levels with a control group of unmerged hospitals. 
Data Envelopment Analysis and Free Disposal Hull are non-parametric performance 
benchmarking tools that are used to evaluate the performance of multi-input/output organizations 
such as hospitals where the market prices of inputs/outputs are unavailable. The data for this 
study are obtained from the American Hospital Association and Irving Levin Associates for the 
years 2001 to 2011. This research uses panel data on hospitals covering three years before and 
seven years after the merger (2001-2011). 
The main conclusion drawn from the study is that we cannot justify all hospital mergers 
on grounds of efficiency gains. Although hospitals merge with the post-merger expectations of 
higher efficiency, both cross-sectional and panel data analysis of the hospitals suggest that some 
hospitals had a decrease in efficiency scores in the years following the merger. It was also 
observed that the control group and the merger group had similar trends in the pre/post-merger 
periods. Additional analysis using difference-in-difference methods and non-parametric ANOVA 
tests also confirmed these findings. Under the assumption that hospitals have more control over 
their outputs than inputs, larger sized for-profit and urban hospitals showed higher efficiencies 
than their counterparts. Another significant finding from the study is that the merger effect is 
more pronounced in Micropolitan areas.  
Overall, this study contributes to the DEA and FDH literature by demonstrating the 
efficiency calculations for hospitals that undergo mergers. Hospital management can use these 
methods as a performance benchmarking tool to identify the efficiency of their organization and 
re-allocate resources to improve efficiency. The two-stage DEA analysis can be specifically used 
when hospital administrators are contemplating an upcoming merger with another hospital, 
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INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
 
Hospital mergers have been increasing in recent years. With soaring healthcare 
expenditures in the United States, hospital mergers are closely studied by healthcare experts, 
policy makers and antitrust agencies. Higher healthcare costs are of concern to hospital 
authorities and policy makers since they result in higher healthcare prices for consumers.  
There have been conflicting findings on the effects of hospital mergers. Antitrust agencies 
disputed many mergers that occurred in the 1990s based on their analysis of the quality and costs 
of the mergers under question.  While theoretical studies on mergers propose potential efficiency 
gains from mergers, some empirical studies find that there have been no significant changes in 
hospital costs and quality associated with mergers, while other studies show price increases 
associated with mergers. 
According to a recent report by the Healthcare Financial Management Association 
(HFMA), hospitals in the United States are seeking partners by acquisitions and affiliations in 
order to reduce the cost of care and improve the coordination of care delivery (HFMA, 
2014). The report emphasizes that the acquisition strategies are primarily focused on 
delivering value to consumers and thus improving the market share of the healthcare 
organization. 
Hospital mergers have been a topic of interest to policy makers, anti-trust agencies, 




rising healthcare expenditures in recent years. The expression “bend the cost curve” 
presupposes that the same level of health services can be obtained more cheaply. Can mergers 
be one solution by which a relatively inefficient hospital (inefficient due to low levels of 
service or high costs of service) may be made more efficient by consolidation with more 
efficient hospitals? 
 There are a number of ways economists can evaluate efficiency gains (or lack thereof) due 
to mergers. Studies so far have given mixed results. Many of the merged hospitals have filed for 
bankruptcy and have shut down in the years following the merger. Existing empirical methods 
may be inadequate because they impose too much structure or because they presuppose hospital 
mergers behaving like competitive businesses, which is generally not the case, especially for 
charity or government hospitals. The purpose of this research study is to reexamine an existing 
topic with the help of relatively newer non-parametric methods and tools and draw a logical 
conclusion using real-time data. Further analyses include efficiency comparisons of merged 
hospitals of various sizes, ownership types, and urbanization levels. The merged hospitals are 
then compared to a group of hospitals that did not undergo any merger (control group) so as to 
identify the effect of mergers, if any. 
Performance efficiency measurement of non-profit organizations such as hospitals are 
difficult to compute due to the types of services they provide, absence of profits and stock 
market indices as performTableance proxies, and because of the complexities of pricing in an 
insured world. Therefore, this research focuses on computing the efficiency of hospitals using a 
technique that does not require the market prices of inputs and outputs associated with hospitals. 




their efficiency and using them as a benchmark to identify the efficiencies of the relatively 
underperforming hospitals. These results will be of use to health planners and hospital 
managers. Unlike previous studies, my research analyzes the merged hospitals for a longer 
period following the merger rather than observing it for just one or two years after the merger. 
The changes that follow immediately after the merger may not be a real indication of the merger 
effect, as it takes some time for merger-related changes to take place. Hence, I believe that this 
study identifies the merger-related efficiency changes more accurately. Moreover, earlier studies 
on hospital mergers have treated the merged hospitals as a single entity even though the 
hospitals operate as separate physical entities/cost centers after the merger. In this research, I 
specifically focus on the hospitals that are acquired (usually the smaller hospitals) by bigger 
hospital chains. 
Another realm of study investigates the overall efficiency of the merged hospitals. Pre- 
and post-merger studies have analyzed whether the merged hospital functions are on par with 
pre-merger expectations, using both parametric and non-parametric approaches. This study 
applies Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to a panel data set to analyze the efficiencies of 
hospitals before and after mergers. The goal is to identify the best performing hospitals and their 
efficiency and use them as a benchmark to improve the efficiencies of the relatively 
underperforming hospitals. 
A traditional acquisition activity in the healthcare system involves a stronger system 
acquiring a weaker system, the latter in need of capital investment (HFMA, 2014).  In most 
cases, a hospital merger/acquisition involves two types of hospitals: 1) the acquirer hospital, 




target hospital, which is typically a hospital that is being merged/acquired/leased by the acquirer 
hospital. Acquisition models vary with respect to the participating hospitals’ goals and 
initiatives: combined entity models to collaborative models. In this research, we focus only on 
the target hospital since it is more important to analyze the efficiency change of this hospital in 
the post-merger period. This is because the target hospital is often facing financial concerns and 
the merger may provide financial support. The acquirer hospitals are usually bigger hospital 
chains of ten to fifteen hospitals, so the addition of a small target hospital may not have a 
significant effect on their efficiency. 
Furthermore, in some cases, the ownership status of the target hospitals changes as per 
the legal agreements and contracts of the merger. A comparison is thus made between the 
efficiencies of for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals in the post-merger periods. Another goal of 
this ex-post analysis of hospital mergers with a large panel data set is to verify whether the target 
hospitals are indeed inefficient prior to the mergers. This helps us to answer the question: Is it the 
inefficiency that leads to the mergers or vice versa? 
Efficiency Concepts 
 
The term efficiency usually indicates the ratio of outputs to inputs. The production of a 
good or service is considered economically efficient when it is produced at the lowest possible 
cost under the assumption that all else are equal. Economic efficiency depends on the prices of 
inputs. Farrell (1957) explains economic efficiency as a combination of both technical 
efficiency and allocative efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to the optimal use of inputs 
that minimize the production costs, whereas technical efficiency refers to the optimization of 




Ray (2004) distinguishes the terms economic efficiency and technical efficiency. Ray 
explains that the objective of any firm is to produce the maximum output from an input bundle, 
and the benchmark is determined by the technology. According to Ray, technical efficiency is 
the comparison of output produced with this benchmark quantity. Farrell’s measure of 
technical efficiency is calculated by comparing the actual output produced to the benchmark 
quantity. It should be noted that the economic efficiency calculations use the market prices of 
inputs and outputs, whereas the technical efficiency calculations depend only on the 
technology available to the firm. 
Farrell explains the concept of efficiency with a firm producing a single product with two 
inputs, under constant returns to scale conditions. Figure 1 is adapted from Farrell (1957). 
Isoquant I represents the various combinations of two inputs that a perfectly efficient firm may 
use to produce a unit output. Points A and D use the same ratio of inputs to produce a unit 
output. The ratio OD/OA represents the technical efficiency of the firm. A perfectly efficient 
firm will have an efficiency of unity. Farrell explains that the firm produces the same output as A 
using only a fraction OD/OA as much of each inputs. This also means that the firm produces 
OD/OA times as much output from the same inputs.  
The concept of allocative efficiency is explained by Farrell as follows. If PP’ in Figure 1 
has a slope that equals the ratio of the prices of the two inputs x1 and x2, the optimal method of 
production will be D’ in spite of D and D’ being on the same efficiency frontier. Although D  
and D’ have 100% technical efficiency, the costs of production at D’ are only a fraction OB/OD 








Figure 1.  Technical and allocative efficiencies. 
 
 
This study examines only the technical efficiencies associated with merged hospitals. 
The computation of technical efficiency is more suitable in this case, as the majority of 
hospitals are non-profit organizations and their input prices are unavailable.  In this 
dissertation, I attempt to answer the following: 
1.   Is it the inefficiency that leads to the mergers or vice versa, and why? 
 
2.   How does efficiency vary by ownership type: Do for-profit and not-for-profit 
hospitals behave differently after mergers? 
3.   How do their efficiencies trend in the pre-/post-merger period?  
 





5.   How do hospitals in urban areas compare with those in rural areas? 
 
The primary objective of this study is to investigate whether mergers produce the 
claimed results. Careful comparisons are conducted and logical explanations are formulated 
for all the above questions. These are important considerations that can lead to meaningful 
conclusions that are useful in the formulation of policies regarding healthcare. The above 
questions are answered using a linear programming based tool known as Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) on a countrywide hospital merger dataset for the years 2001-2011. 
The data for this study are obtained from the American Hospital Association and 
Irving Levin Associates for the years 2001 to 2011. This research uses panel data on hospitals 
covering three years before and seven years after the merger (2001-2011). In addition to 
DEA, an alternate non-parametric method known as Free Disposal Hull (FDH) is applied to 
the above data to overcome the convexity limitations posed by Data Envelopment Analysis. 
Furthermore, the DEA efficiency scores are bias-corrected using Simar and Wilson’s (1998) 
bootstrapping technique, and a Tobit censored regression model is used to perform a two-stage 
regression to identify the determinants of hospital efficiency scores. 
Unlike prior merger studies that focuses only on specific applications and methods of 
analysis, this work implements several approaches and thus allows for greater generality in the 
interpretation of results. The use of a dataset with a larger post-merger timespan, takes into 
account of the fact that hospitals take a longer time to adjust after the merger.  The efficiency 
changes may not be evident immediately in the first or second year following the merger. The 
larger timespan of eleven years and the use of a panel dataset makes the dataset stronger with 





From a policy standpoint, it is important for hospital management to analyze the effect of 
mergers since they are closely scrutinized by Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department 
of Justice.  Literature on horizontal mergers discusses tradeoffs between economic efficiency 
gain from cost savings and price increases from monopoly power. An important contribution to 
this literature is Williamson‘s (1968) trade-off model which favors merger decisions with a total 
welfare approach, where the consumer welfare losses from the price increase is offset by the 
efficiency gains. Moreover, mergers are an example of marketplace conservatorships, where a 
failing firm merges with a stronger one to avoid a shutdown or with the expectation of efficiency 
gains. Banks and airline industries have witnessed many mergers in the past. 
The results from this study dispel the notion that mergers often lead to efficiency gains.  
Despite the type of hospital or merger experience, there is a rising inefficiency in the hospitals 
over time. This could be attributed to investments in state-of-the-art technologies, insurance 
coverage offered and proximity of a hospital to a highly ranked hospital. Further research in this 
area can analyze the hospital efficiencies with the above mentioned constraints.  
Due to competition in healthcare industry, there are benefits such as lower cost and more 
innovation. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforces antitrust laws to maintain competition. 
There have been empirical studies that have been done by the FTC involving effects of mergers 
in nonprofit hospitals. My studies takes a step further in analyzing for-profit hospitals also. 
Irrespective of the type of hospital, my studies concur with the fact that mergers cause an 
increase in inefficiency in hospitals.  FTC can make use of such studies to make a considered 





Higher healthcare costs are of concern to hospital authorities and policy makers since 
they result in higher healthcare prices for consumers. I expect that my research will provide a 
novel perspective to re-evaluate the significance of the legislation and policies related to hospital 
mergers. Therefore, the goal of this study is to fill the gaps in the existing literature of hospital 
merger studies using DEA and provide meaningful explanations of specific changes related to 
mergers. Chapter 2 provides a literature review and describes previous studies on hospital 
mergers and their efficiencies. Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical model and data used for this  
study. Chapter 4 presents the results of the study. The final chapter discusses the findings and 










This section briefly summarizes the literature on hospital mergers. The literature 
surveyed here focuses on the theory of mergers, the post-merger effects on cost, price, 
productivity, hospital efficiency, and on various parametric and non-parametric methods utilized 
to analyze merger data. The 1990s saw a significant spike in hospital mergers in the United 
States and several empirical studies examined these mergers. 
The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows. Although there is an extensive 
literature on mergers, not many studies have used non-parametric approaches to identify the 
efficiency in merged hospitals. Using a non-parametric approach minimizes functional form 
misspecification problems. In addition, non-parametric approaches such as DEA and FDH are 
devoid of regression related asymptotics and standard errors. While traditional regression 
analysis require large datasets, these non-parametric approaches can be implemented on a much 
smaller fixed dataset (in this case - the number of hospital mergers). The DEA and FDH studies 
reviewed in this section treat the merged entity as one organization and calculate the 
performance efficiency, but do not identify variables that affect efficiency. The research method 
used in this study enhances the existing literature by including these specifics in the DEA and 
FDH analyses. Further, most of the studies reviewed here use cross sectional data and a small 





Economies of Scope, Scale and Efficiency Studies on Hospital Mergers 
 
Ho and Hamilton (2000) used traditional regression methods to analyze the effect of 
hospital consolidations on patient outcomes and the quality of patient care. The study did not 
find any substantial evidence that mergers lowered inpatient mortality or patient readmission 
rates. Dranove (1998) used semi-parametric methods to analyze the economies of scale in the 
cost centers of hospitals. Dranove’s research suggests that economies of scale are notable only in 
smaller hospital mergers. The study also suggested that the efficiency gains associated with cost 
centers in small hospital mergers is very small. To study the price effects of hospital mergers, 
Krishnan and Krishnan (2003) analyzed the hospital merger data using regression methods.  
Their study is based on the theoretical framework that mergers lower the marginal cost of the 
hospital due to efficiency gains. These efficiency gains are eventually transferred to the  
consumers in the form of lower prices. Krishnan and Krishnan thus argue that consumers 
experience higher prices if there are no efficiency gains associated with the mergers.  
The results from this empirical study suggest that there were no efficiency gains 
for merged hospitals in the short run. Sinay (1998) studied the pre- and post-merger 
operating efficiencies of hospitals using U.S. hospital data for a three-year span. Among 
other things, Sinay used a multiproduct cost function to measure the relative efficiencies 
among merged hospitals. Sinay concluded that merged hospitals attained efficiency by 
increasing their costs of production. Another study by Spang, Arnould, and Bazzoli 
(2009) analyzed the effect of urban hospital mergers on hospital efficiency and prices. 
The study aimed to analyze the cost and price outcomes of non-rural hospital mergers. 




and price effects of merged hospitals. The study also analyzed the merger effects on 
hospital ownership. The empirical results suggest that for-profit hospitals are more 
efficient after consolidation. There are no cost-savings associated with not-for-profit 
hospitals. 
 
One of the comprehensive reviews on the above empirical studies on hospital mergers 
was conducted by Vogt and Town (2006). Their report summarizes research done on effects of 
hospital mergers on healthcare prices, quality and costs. Their research primarily examines the 
reasons for the surge in hospital consolidations in the 1990s and the effects of hospital 
consolidations on hospital costs, price and quality of inpatient care. Based on the studies, 
Vogt and Town could not find any conclusive evidence for the merger wave in the 1990s. The 
authors also conclude that a merger increases hospital prices for the most part and decreases the 
quality of patient care. Another interesting study on mergers was conducted by Dafny (2009) 
wherein he analyzes the response of rivals to the mergers. Using an instrumental variable 
approach for the rival analysis, Dafny finds that a merger induces price increases among rival 
hospitals.  
Hospital Merger Studies Using Data Envelopment Analysis 
Although there is an extensive literature on the application of DEA for the performance 
evaluation of banks, airline industries, schools and various other for-profit and not-for-profit 
organizations, not much work has been done on hospital mergers using this method. One of the 
initial studies analyzing hospital efficiency using a non-parametric approach was done by 
Harris, Ozgen, and Ozcan (2000). The authors used the DEA approach to investigate the 




variable returns to scale models of DEA to study the technical and scale efficiency of hospitals. 
They concluded that the merged hospitals are more efficient than their pre-merger counterparts. 
The authors also observed that scale efficiency dominates technical efficiency in their 
contribution to improving the overall efficiency of the hospital. A drawback of the study is that 
it analyzes only one year of pre- and post-merger data. 
Ferrier and Valdmanis (2004) performed a similar study using the DEA to assess the 
productivity and efficiency of merged hospitals. The authors compared the efficiency scores of 
merged hospitals to those of a control group of non-merged hospitals. They also used the 
Malmquist index to assess the productivity, technical efficiency, and scale efficiency 
differences between the two types of hospitals. 
A working paper by Peyrache (2012) introduces a measure of industrial inefficiency of 
an organization and compares it to the existing definitions of other inefficiency components 
such as total, technical, and size inefficiency. The author uses the Directional Distance Function 
(DDF) representation of the DEA technology and decomposes the industrial structural 
inefficiency into its components. Peyrache applies this method to healthcare data on public 
hospitals in Australia. DEA does not require any price information and uses only input and 
output quantities. Using the empirical results from the model, the author argues that technical 
inefficiency is only 15% of the total industry inefficiency, whereas 85% of the industry 
inefficiency is attributable to the organization inefficiency that includes size inefficiency.  
Another healthcare-related paper by Nyman and Bricker (1989) analyzes nursing home 
efficiencies using DEA method. They also use regression analysis to determine the factors that 




homes is then conducted to understand the differences in objectives of these two types of 
nursing homes. The empirical results show that for-profit nursing homes are more efficient than 
not-for-profit homes. Another more recent study on hospitals by Zere et al. (2006) looks at the 
efficiencies of Namibian public hospitals using DEA. The analysis was performed on four years 
of hospital data and the robustness of these results were checked using jackknife analysis. 
Hospital Merger Studies Using Service Variable 
 
One of the few studies that have used the number of hospital services as an indicator of 
effectiveness is Treat (1976). This study compares the effectiveness of urban and rural hospital 
mergers. Using 1956-1970 U.S. hospital merger data, the author compares pairs of merging and 
non-merging hospitals. The hospitals were grouped by size, location and nature of post-merging 
reporting. The methodologies used are mean value analysis for all performance measures and a 
paired t-test for means and non-parametric sign test for medians. The author concludes that 
urban hospitals have increased costs associated with increased services, but rural hospitals 
experience an expansion in services without increased costs. 
Application of Free Disposal Hull Method 
 
There have been very few studies in the literature on the application of FDH. Wang, 
Song, and Cullinane (2003) examined and compared container port production performance 
using two alternate methods: DEA and FDH. The results showed that both methods lead to 
different conclusions regarding the performance frontier, where the FDH method seemingly 
demonstrates a better fit enveloping a greater number of hospitals. A paper by de Borger and 
Kerstens (1996) analyzes the efficiency of Belgian local governments using non-parametric 




frontiers. The efficiency scores were analyzed and the economic and political factors associated 
with the inefficiencies were investigated.  
Application of Bootstrapping and Two-stage DEA 
Kirigia and Asbu (2013) use a two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis method to compute 
and analyze the inefficiencies of Eritrean hospitals. The efficiency of the hospitals is estimated 
using DEA. In the second stage, the authors use a Tobit model to regress the DEA efficiency on 
external factors that affect hospital performance. The authors estimate the relative technical and 
scale efficiencies of Eritrean public hospitals and determine the input and output changes that 
would make the hospitals efficient. 
 An interesting study of European football clubs by Halkos and Tzeremes (2011) uses 
DEA and the Simar and Wilson bootstrap procedure to evaluate the football club’s performance. 
The second stage determines the impact of football clubs’ current value and debt levels on their 
efficiency. The empirical results showed that, although the current value of the clubs had a 
negative influence on their performance, their debt levels did not impact their efficiency in any 
way.  
In their paper on evaluating the technical efficiencies of crop farms in Ghana, Abatania, 
Hailu and Amin (2012) uses two-stage DEA method with bootstrapped DEA score in the second 
stage analysis. An empirical DEA model with input orientation is used to estimate the scale and 
technical efficiencies of the farms. The second stage of the analysis uses bias-corrected efficiency 
scores in an OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) model to identify the determinants of farm efficiency. 
The DEA analysis showed that the farms were inefficient and had a high scale efficiency attributing 




geographical location of farms, hired labor, gender and age of head of household had significant 
impacts on technical efficiency of the crop farms in Ghana.  
In their paper on evaluating the technical efficiencies of crop farms in Ghana, Abatania, 
Hailu, and Amin (2012) used two-stage DEA method with bootstrapped DEA score in the 
second stage analysis. The bootstrapping technique was implemented to bias correct the 
efficiency scores obtained in the first stage analysis. The results indicated that geographical 
location of farms, hired labor, and gender and age of head of household had significant impacts 
on technical efficiency of the crop farms in Ghana. 
Another application of two-stage DEA with Tobit is the study by Rassouli-Currier 
(2007) that evaluates the efficiency of Oklahoma school districts. A second-stage DEA using 
Tobit regression is used to identify the sources of inefficiency. The researcher concluded that 
the student characteristics and family environment were the key factors that affected the 
efficiency of the schools. A similar paper by Denaux (2009) reviews the efficiencies of Georgia 
urban-rural public schools. The study uses a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test to examine 
the differences in efficiency scores between the rural and public schools. A second-stage Tobit 
regression analysis is used to identify the factors that contribute to the observed differences in 
the efficiency scores. 
One of the recent applications of two-stage DEA on hospital mergers was done by Groff, 
Lien, and Su (2000), wherein a control sample of non-merger hospitals is used to compare the 
technical efficiencies of hospitals.  This study uses DEA to evaluate the hospital efficiency in 
the years immediately following the merger. In the second stage, a merger-status variable was 




authors concluded that the hospitals were more efficient two years after the merger as compared 
to the year following the merger. 
Although there is an extensive literature on hospital mergers, not many studies have 
used non-parametric approaches to identify the efficiency in merged hospitals. Further, most of 
the studies reviewed here use cross-sectional data and a small time span.  The DEA and FDH 
studies reviewed above treat the merged entity as one organization and calculate the 
performance efficiency, but do not identify variables that affect efficiency. The research 
methodology used in this study enhances the existing literature by including these specifics in 








THE MODEL AND DATA ANALYSIS 
 
 
The goal of this study is to apply non-parametric approaches to evaluate the efficiency 
of hospital mergers. Non-parametric approaches are not subject to the assumptions of 
traditional regression analysis, such as the normality of error terms. The proposed method 
entails an understanding of merger concepts and the DEA non-parametric approach. These are 
described briefly in the following sections. 
Data Envelopment Analysis is usually implemented to determine this efficiency 
measure. As explained in Ramanathan (2003), the estimated efficiencies are relative to the 
best performing Decision Making Unit (DMU) in the group under study.  The DMUs in our 
study are the hospitals that participate in mergers. Hospitals use a set of inputs to produce a set 
of outputs. The DEA method assists in determining the effectiveness of the transformation of 
the inputs into outputs. Each hospital is assigned an efficiency score, relative to the best 
hospitals in the group.   The efficiency scores vary between 0 and 100 percent. Hospitals with 
 
100% efficiency form the efficiency frontier. The frontier is formed by a convex combination of 
efficient hospitals that act as a reference for the inefficient hospitals. This frontier hosts the best 
performing hospitals, and the hospitals that lie below this frontier are considered inefficient. The  
idea is that, if one hospital is able to produce outputs from a set of inputs in an efficient manner, 





Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and a relatively newer Free Disposal Hull (FDH) 
are two of the most popular non-parametric techniques used to estimate efficiencies of 
organizations with multiple inputs and outputs. This study compares the efficiency estimated 
from the above methods. Both methods are described in the following sections.  
Data Envelopment Analysis 
The concept of DEA was introduced by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). It was 
later extended by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). DEA was originally developed to 
measure the performance of non-profit organizations. As explained in Ramanathan (2003), the 
performance efficiency measurements of non-profit organizations are difficult due to the types 
of services they provide and also due to the lack of profits and stock market indices as an 
indicator. DEA uses linear programing techniques to estimate the efficiency scores for each of 
the firms in the study. 
Hospitals are multiple input-output organizations and hence DEA is well suited to 
evaluate their performance efficiency. DEA is used in the efficiency analysis of firms such as 
hospitals and schools, where the market prices of inputs and outputs are not always known. 
Although there have been many studies using the DEA method, it imposes strong limitations on 
its convexity assumptions on the productions possibility set. DEA is now widely used as a 
performance evaluation tool for hospitals, schools, banks and even manufacturing companies. 
Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) define technical efficiency of multi-input and multi- 
output firms as follows: 
 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 =  (
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠




This study analyzes the technical efficiency from input- and output-oriented measures. 
Input-oriented efficiency refers to minimizing the inputs for a given level of outputs. Output-
oriented efficiency refers to maximizing the outputs, holding the inputs constant. This study also 
compares the hospitals that operate under constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to 
scale (VRS). The two most widely used DEA models are CCR (Charnes, Cooper & Rhodes, 
1978) and BCC (Banker, Charnes & Cooper, 1984). The DEA-CCR model assumes constant 
returns to scale and the BCC model assumes variable returns to scale frontiers. 
The output-maximizing CCR linear programming model can be written as follows. 
Suppose there are N hospitals indexed by i = 1,….,N and each hospital i produces L outputs 
denoted by Yli (where l = 1,….,L) using M inputs Xmi (where m = 1,….,M). ).  The term Xmi 
represents the quantity of mth input used by ith hospital and Yli denotes the quantity of lth output 
produced by ith hospital. For example, if hospital 2(i =2) uses 100 beds (m), Xmi is denoted as 
100m2. Similarly, if hospital 2 produces an output of 200 admissions, Yli is represented as 200l2. 
The technical efficiency of the ith hospital can be obtained from the following linear 
program: 












 – ∑ umXmi
M
m=1
  ≤ 0  




where vl and um are the weights assigned to output l and input m respectively. The unknowns, ul 




represents the virtual output (linear weighted sum of all outputs) and ∑ umXmi
M
m=1
 represents the 
virtual input (linear weighted sum of all inputs). The technical efficiency of the hospital is defined 
as the ratio of virtual outputs to virtual inputs. Since it is difficult to solve fractional programs, the 
denominator is normalized to estimate the efficiency of each hospital, as denoted by the first 
constraint in the above linear program. The hospital for which the efficiency is maximized is the 
reference hospital and each linear program gives the efficiency of only one hospital. Separate 
linear programs are developed and solved to compute the efficiency of other hospitals in the 
sample. Each hospital may assign a different set of weights to their inputs and outputs depending 
on the importance they give to these inputs and outputs. Hence a separate constraint is written for 
the hospital other than the reference hospital in each linear program. Therefore, the objective of 
the linear program is to maximize the efficiency of the reference hospital subject to the constraint 
that the efficiencies of other hospitals in the sample are restricted between the values of zero and 
one.  Similarly, the formulation for an output-oriented BCC model is as follows: 












 - ∑ umXmi −  vi
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ul, vm   ≥  0         (3) 
where ul and vm are the weights assigned to output l and input m respectively. The difference 
between the formulations of the CCR and BCC model DEA linear programs is the addition of 
an intercept term ui. A positive ui represents increasing returns to scale, a negative ui 
represents decreasing returns to scale, and ui = 0 represents a constant returns to scale LP 
model. 
Using a linear programming approach, a piecewise linear envelop is constructed over 
the data. We need to write a linear program for each hospital involved in the study. Technical 




There are primarily two types of model orientations in DEA: input-oriented models and 
output-oriented models. Input-oriented models quantify the amount of inputs that can be reduced 
proportionally while holding the outputs fixed. On the other hand, output-oriented models point 
to the amount of output that can be expanded proportionally with fixed inputs. Both these 
orientations represent the amount of inputs or outputs that can be changed so that a firm can 
attain a technical efficiency of one hundred percent to be on the frontier. There is another model 
orientation known as the non-orientation model. This model quantifies the amount of input and 
output that can be simultaneously changed to make a firm technically efficient.  
Figures 2 and 3 demonstrate basic input- and output-oriented models respectively, the 
DMU being a hospital in this case.  Both input- and output-oriented models identify the same set 



















and C is considered inefficient because it is not on the frontier. In the case of an input-oriented 
model, the distance CC1 determines the amount and direction of inputs that need to be reduced 
proportionally for C to become efficient. Similarly, in the output-oriented model, the distance 
CC1 represents the amount and direction of outputs that can be increased to make C efficient.  
Production Technology 
The efficiency calculations by DEA can be conducted under Constant Returns to 
Scale (CRS) or Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) scale assumptions of the firm’s production 
technology. VRS refers to increasing and decreasing returns to scale models. In a CRS 
model, the outputs change by the same proportions as the change in the inputs. In a VRS 
production technology, the outputs may increase, decrease, or remain constant for any 
change in inputs.  
Figure 4 differentiates both CRS and VRS frontiers in an output-oriented setup. The 
frontier represents the maximum output that can be generated by a firm using a fixed level of 
inputs. Under CRS assumption, only firm C forms the efficiency frontier while firms A, C 
and D are deemed inefficient. On the other hand, under the VRS assumption, all the firms 
except C form the efficiency frontier. The capacity underutilization associated with the CRS 
assumption is larger than that of the VRS assumption. The CRS specification is valid in 







Figure 4. CRS, VRS frontiers. 
 
 
The input- and output-oriented efficiency scores are similar for both CRS specifications, 
but may differ for VRS specification. In order to conduct the DEA efficiency calculations, we 
need to specify the orientation of the model. The DEA model orientation selection depends on 
which factors (inputs or outputs) the firm has more control over. Hospitals have more control 
over their outputs than inputs since they have to work on fixed inputs. A VRS output-oriented 
model is more appropriate in the hospital merger efficiency calculations.  
Free Disposal Hull 
Free Disposal Hull (FDH) is a counterpart to DEA and an alternate performance 




made by DEA is the convexity of the production possibility set. The concept of FDH was 
introduced by Deprins, Simar, and Tulkens (1984). FDH assumes free disposability of inputs 
and outputs and relaxes the convexity assumption of DEA. The frontier from FDH has been 
argued to have a better fit, enveloping more efficient hospitals as compared to the frontier 
from DEA. 
Ray (2004) explains the free disposability concept as follows. For any input-output 
combination (x0, y0), the free disposal hull of this bundle is defined as: 
FDH(x0, y0) = {(x, y): x ≥ x0, y ≤ y0} 
 
The free disposability of inputs and outputs suggests that every input-output combination of 
(x, y) ɛ FDH(x0, y0) involves no less input and no more output. Ray (2004) explains that the 
bundle (x0, y0) is more efficient because it produces the same output with less input, or 
produces more output from the same input or produces more output using less 
input. Hence the dominance of (x0, y0) over (x, y). The argument is based on the possibility of 
underutilization of a firm’s resources.  The production possibility set is a combination of the 
FDH of all the individual input-output bundles in the dataset. For an n input, m output 
technology for j observations, the efficiency frontier is specified as: 
 
TFDH = {(x,y): x ≥ ∑ 𝜆𝑗𝑥
𝑗𝑁
𝑗=1 ; y ≤ ∑  𝜆𝑗𝑦
𝑗𝑁
𝑗=1 ; ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1  =1; λj ɛ [0,1}; j= 1,2,…,N}                      (4) 
FDH computes technical efficiency using the concept of dominance.  This differs from 
the DEA efficiency frontier in terms of λj. Since λj is either 0 or 1 and adds up to 1, only 1 λ will 
be unity and hence only 1 firm will be considered for the dominance comparisons. Hence, 
instead of forming the efficiency frontier with a convex combination of the hospitals, FDH 




Figure 5, adapted from Chilingerian (1995), depicts all the non-parametric deterministic 
frontiers discussed above. The production possibility sets/efficiency frontiers are different for all 
three models. It is observed that the hospitals that are efficient under FDH may not always be 
considered efficient by DEA-CCR and DEA-BCC models. The FDH frontier is a step function, 












 Therefore, we can see that FDH analysis is a special case of BCC-DEA with relaxation 
of convexity constraints, but further restriction on the weight constraints. Thus, the technical 
efficiency scores obtained from FDH analysis may be higher than those from DEA. 
Data and Methods 
The data for this study are obtained from the American Hospital Association (AHA) and 
Irving Levin Associates for the years 2001 to 2011. The American Hospital Association 
conducts yearly surveys on hospitals in the United States. Irving Levin Associates publishes the 
names of all of the U.S. hospital mergers annually. The AHA data has been extensively used in 
past studies of hospital mergers. The research focuses on the hospitals that merged in the years 
2003 and 2004. A control sample of 31 hospitals that did not undergo any mergers was 
included in the analysis. Data from 2001-2011 were collected for all the hospitals that were 
merged in 2003 and 2004 (37 and 59 respectively). Due to data availability constraints, the 
final sample consists of 97 hospitals: 35 hospitals that merged in 2003, 31 hospitals that 
merged in 2004, and 31 control hospitals. 
The literature suggests that DEA researchers focus on the homogeneity assumption of the 
DMUs than the actual number of DMUs. Homogeneity in DMUs refers to the DMUs having 
comparable inputs and outputs, similar objectives and providing similar services. Cooper et al. 
(2000) provide a rule of thumb for the selection of a sample: n ≥ max {m*s, 3(m + s)}. This 
means that the number of observations (n) must be greater than the maximum of the products of 
inputs (m) and outputs (s) and 3 times the sum of the number of inputs and outputs. The sample 
size in this study satisfies the above criteria with n=97, which is greater than max {16, 12} with 




consists of 1067 observations of 97 hospitals (see Table 12 in Appendix) for the dataset. Because 
many hospital names were changed after the merger, the table shows their current names. The 
DMUs numbered 1 through 31 represent the hospitals that were merged in 2004, DMUs 32 
through 66 represent the hospitals that were merged in 2003, and DMUs 66 through 97 represent 
the control group. 
Selection of Inputs and Outputs 
The inputs and outputs used in this study are consistent with those used in previous 
literature on hospital mergers using DEA.  In DEA, there are no specific criteria for the selection 
of inputs and outputs for performance evaluation (Ramanathan, 2003). Although there are no 
specific guidelines, Ramanathan (2003) suggests that these inputs and outputs must be relevant 
to the study and must have a bearing on the performance of the DMU. Cooper et al. (2000) 
suggests that smaller input amounts and larger output amounts are preferable in this approach as 
it would be easier to analyze the efficiency scores. An advantage of DEA analysis is that the 
measurement units of inputs and outputs need not be the same (Cooper et al., 2000).  Figure 6 
depicts the input and output variables used in the study.  Hospitals are typically multi-input 
multi-output systems and DEA is one of the most popular tools that evaluate their efficiency. 
Table 1 gives the definitions of these variables as defined in the 2006 AHA Guide Code Chart. 
Farrell’s (1957) measure of DEA and FDH technical efficiency scores are estimated 
using the Efficiency Measurement System (EMS Version 1.3, 2000) designed by Holger Scheel 
and FEAR 1.0 (Wilson, 2007), which is based on the statistical package R. EMS is capable of 
handling multiple inputs and outputs for various specifications of model orientations  

























Admissions Number of patients accepted for inpatient service during 
a 12-month period 
Census Average number of inpatients receiving care each day 
during the 12 month reporting period 
Outpatient Visits Visits by a patient who is not admitted in the hospital 
and receiving medical, dental or other services. 
Excludes follow-up visits 















Number of beds, cribs and pediatric bassinets regularly 
maintained for inpatients at the close of the reporting 
period 
Various services (diagnostic, inpatient, outpatient and 
other) provided by the hospital 
Represents full-time and part-time personnel. Includes 
Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) of part-time personnel. 
Two part-time persons were counted as one full-time 
person 








scale). The bootstrapped DEA scores for the two-stage DEA are also estimated using FEAR 1.0 
(Wilson, 2007). Cross-sectional and time series analyses are conducted on the dataset or the 
years 2001-2011. This study utilizes both CRS and VRS models for both input and output 





The application of DEA is illustrated with an example for both input- and output-
oriented setups. Table 2 provides data for three hospitals with two inputs and two outputs. 
 
Table 2 
Sample DEA Setup of Three Hospitals with Two Inputs and Two Outputs 
  Beds(Input) Personnel(Input) TotExp(Output) Admissions(Output) 
DMU 1 73 244 8632 3751 
DMU 2 289 1233 108081 12910 





The output-oriented linear programming setup for hospital 1, under a CRS 
assumption, is formulated as follows: 




8632 vT1  + 3751 vA1  – 73 uB1  – 244 uP1  0 (Hospital 1) 
 
108081 vT1  + 12910 vA1  – 289 uB1 – 1233 uP1  0 (Hospital 2) 
 
33277 vT1  + 4505 vA1  – 124 uB1  – 324 uP1  0 (Hospital 3) 
 
73 uB1  + 244 uP1 = 1 
 
vT1, vA1, uB1, uP1  ≥ 0 (5) 
where vT1, vA1, uB1, uP1 are the weights assigned to the outputs (total expenses, admissions) and 
inputs (beds, personnel) for hospital 1 respectively. Similarly, the input-minimizing linear 









8632 λ1  + 108081 λ2  + 33277 λ3   ≥   8632 
 
3751 λ1  + 12910 λ2  + 4505 λ3   ≥   3751 
 
73 λ1  + 289 λ2  + 124 λ3  ≤ 73 δ 
 
244 λ1  + 1233 λ2  + 324 λ3  ≤ 244 δ 
 
λ1, λ2, λ3    ≥ 0, δ unrestricted (6) 
 
where λ1, λ2, λ3 are the weights assigned to each hospital and δ is the efficiency index. 
 
Similar linear programs are formulated for each hospital in the sample. The values of all 
the decision variables of both the above linear programming problems are solved by the DEA 
software. 
Non-parametric ANOVA Tests 
 
This study uses two non-parametric tests to detect the differences between two or 
 
more independent samples that have observations independent of one another. Non-parametric 
tests are usually used when the data does not meet the assumptions for a parametric test. These 
include the non-normality of the data, difference in variance between groups, and ordinality of 
data. 
 
Mann-Whitney U test is one of the most popular tests to compare populations and is 
used here to see if the distribution of efficiency scores is same in two groups. The observations 
in the sample are ranked from low to high and rank totals are calculated for both the samples. If 




rankings. The Mann-Whitney U statistic is computed using these ranks and the number of 
observations in each sample and is indicative of whether the difference observed between the 
samples is purely by chance or not. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is an extension of the Mann-Whitney U test and yet another non- 
parametric rank test to compare two or more independent samples. It is analogous to the 
parametric F-test and is also known as one-way-ANOVA on ranks.  Similar to the Mann- 
Whitney U test, it does not assume that the sample comes from a normal distribution. The 
method is similar to the Mann-Whitney U test, the main difference being that it can be applied to 
more than two sample groups. 
The above non-parametric tests are used in this study to determine whether the 
difference in mean efficiency scores between the merger group and control group are 
significant. The null hypothesis is that the samples have the same means or medians, i.e., they 




This study uses a difference-in-difference (DD) estimator to examine the effect of a 
merger on hospitals, if any. The DD approach requires a treatment group and a control group, 
the treatment group differing from the control group only with respect to the treatment 
variable (the variable of interest).  The assumption behind this approach is that, without the 
treatment, the unobserved differences between the control and treatment groups are the same. 
Figure 7 explains the approach. Data on the outcome variable is collected at pre-treatment and 




treatment group. A1D represents the A1A2 in the absence of a treatment. The normal difference 
between the treatment and control group is represented by the distance C2D and the treatment 
effect is represented by A2D. 
The DD estimator can be determined using OLS regression with a dummy variable for 
the treatment. The DD estimator  β̂ can be represented as:  
β̂ = (A2 – A1) – (C2 – C1)  
The dataset in this study contains two groups before and after the merger, with the 
treatment group being affected by the merger, and the control group being unaffected by the 
merger. DD estimates compare the difference in group means for pre-merger DEA efficiency 
scores to the difference in group means of post-merger DEA scores. A larger post-merger DEA 
score difference indicates a larger effect of the merger. The hypothesis is that less efficient 
hospitals become more efficient after undergoing the merger (treatment).  The results are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Two-Stage DEA Analysis with Bootstrapped DEA 
The efficiency scores from the DEA/FDH estimations become the dependent variable in 
the second stage of the DEA analysis. Simar and Wilson (2007) argue that the estimated DEA 
scores are correlated with each other. In addition, the assumption of independence between error 
terms and independent variables are violated when using conventional Ordinary Least Square 
regressions. Hence the DEA scores are bootstrapped using Simar and Wilson’s (2007) double 































Figure 7. Difference-in-difference method. 
 
 
The method of bootstrapping was introduced by Efron (1979) to repeatedly simulate 
the data generating process though a resampling process. The idea is for the bootstrap to 
mimic the sampling distribution of the estimators under consideration. Simar (1992) 
introduced the bootstrap technique to analyze the sensitivity of efficiency scores associated 
with sampling variations in frontier estimation using panel datasets. Simar and Wilson (1998) 
explain the explanation behind adopting a reasonable data generating process for the frontier 
estimation. Simar and Wilson (2000) extend their earlier method by allowing for heterogeneity 





Since the bootstrapped efficiency scores vary between 0-1, it is a censored distribution.  
Chilingerian (1995) suggests blending DEA with Tobit: a censored regression model to adjust 
the efficiency scores based on factors strongly associated with efficiency. Either Tobit or OLS 
models have been frequently used in the second stage of DEA analysis in prior literature. The 
Tobit regression model is more appropriate due to the censored nature of the DEA scores. The 
efficiency scores are censored between zero and one. 
Following Greene (1993), the DEA scores were censored at zero using the formula: 
Inefficiency score = (1/DEA score) – 1.  The inefficiency score is a limited dependent variable 
since the values are restricted between zero and one.  The censored Tobit regression model is 
given as: 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖 = {
0,                                𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝛽𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 ≤ 0
 𝑎𝑖𝛽𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 ,                        𝑖𝑓 0 <  𝑎𝑖𝛽𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 < 1
1,                                𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑖𝛽𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 ≥ 1
     (7) 
where vector ai represents the variables that affect efficiency of hospitals. The empirical 




Inefficiencyi =  αi + β1 Bedsi + β2  Mergeri   + [ β3 Govti   + β4  IOFPi ] + [β4  LCMi   + β6 LFMi 
 
+ β7  MMi   + β8 SMi + β9 Microi ] + εi (8) 
 
 
The variable Beds captures the effect of hospital size on its efficiency. The dummy 
variable Merger indicates whether the hospital is in the treatment group or not. Two dummy 
variables Govt (Government) and IOFP (Investor owned For-profit) analyze the effect of 




LCM (Large Central Metro), LFM (Large Fringe Metro), MM (Medium Metro), SM (Small 
Metro) and Micro (Micropolitan) capture the effect of urbanization levels on the efficiency with 
Noncore as the reference variable. 
The following hypotheses are proposed in this study to analyze the effect of the above 
 
independent variables on the hospital’s inefficiency: 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Hospitals with more staffed beds (large hospitals) are likely to be more 
efficient than medium-sized or small hospitals. 
Hypothesis 2:  Government hospitals are likely to be less efficient compared to not-for-profit 
or for-profit hospitals. 
Hypothesis 3:  Hospitals in urban areas are likely to be more efficient than those in rural areas. 
 
The following chapter explains the results from this empirical study in detail and 








RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
This section describes the dataset used in this study and the findings from various 
analyses. As described in Chapter 3, linear programs were formulated for each hospital in the 
study sample for conducting DEA. Separate analyses were done for input- and output-oriented 
models and for CRS and VRS specifications. Since the VRS output-oriented model is more 
appropriate for the DEA of hospitals, I will be describing these results in more detail in the 
following sections. Cross-sectional and time series analyses are conducted on the dataset for the 
years 2001-2011. This study utilizes both CRS and VRS models for both input and output 
orientations. FDH efficiency scores are then estimated for a comparative study. The hospitals 
that merged in the years 2003 and 2004 were combined to form a single group.  To determine 
the effect of a merger, a control group of hospitals was added to the sample. Pre- and post- 
merger efficiencies were then computed using DEA and FDH for the years 2001-2011. As 
explained in Chapter 1, the DEA scores are calculated for the acquired hospitals, since the study 
primarily focuses on the post-merger performance of these hospitals. 
Since the normality assumption of underlying distribution of efficiency scores cannot be 
tested due to the small sample size, non-parametric ANOVA tests are conducted to determine any 
significant differences between the mean efficiency scores of the control group and merger 
hospitals.  In addition, a DD estimator is used to analyze the effect of mergers on hospitals using 





The DEA scores obtained in the first stage were then bootstrapped using Simar and 
Wilson (2007) algorithm to correct for possible bias associated with the efficiency estimation 
procedure.  There is a potential bias associated with the DEA estimation procedure due to the 
serial correlation between the estimates efficiency scores of the hospitals.  This bias is 
corrected using the bootstrap algorithm. In the second stage, a Tobit model is used to 
regress the bootstrapped DEA on environmental factors that affect hospital efficiency. 
These factors include hospital size, ownership type and urbanization levels. The following 
sections describe the results from the above analyses and their full interpretations. 
Summary statistics of the input and output variables used in the study are given in Table 
3. Data from all eleven years (2001-2011) is used for the computation of means and standard 
deviations. One of the reasons for the large standard deviations is that the hospitals 
of different sizes are taken together in the mean computations. Another reason is that mergers 
lead to considerable changes in the size and services of participating hospitals. 
In the years 2001-2011, 97 hospitals (including control hospitals) received an average of 
7599 patient admissions per year, 105 inpatient visits per day, 117,370 outpatient visits per year 
and 953 infant births in a year. These were produced from an average of 168 staffed beds, 45 














Descriptive Statistics of Inputs and Outputs of Merger Hospitals (n=97) 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Beds 1067 168 133 12 1491 
Services 1067 46 18 2 128 
Personnel 1067 821 1036 40 16414 
Non-payroll 
Expenses 
1067 109544 185876 470 2878966 
Admissions 1067 7599 7123 95 85556 
Census 1067 105 105 1 1336 
Outpatient Visits 1067 117370 167626 0 1853618 
Births 1067 953 987 0 6919 
 
Table 4 shows the number of hospitals in the control group and the merger group. The 
hospitals are grouped by their size (number of staffed beds), ownership type and urbanization 
levels. The control hospitals were chosen in such a way that their characteristics are similar to the 
merger hospitals except for the merger phenomenon. 
 Tables 5 and 6 represent the average input and output levels for both control and merger 
hospitals.  The average levels are computed from the aggregate data for all eleven years (2001-
2011). The similarity of the composition of inputs and outputs between the control group and the 










Hospital Count Grouped by Size, Ownership and Urbanization Levels 
Hospitals Grouped By 
Count 
Control Hospitals Target Hospitals 
Size     
Small 16 18 
Medium 11 37 
Large 4 11 
      
Ownership Type     
Investor Owned For-profit 11 39 
Non Govt Not-for-profit 12 23 
Government 8 4 
      
Urbanization Level     
Large Central Metro 3 17 
Large Fringe Metro 5 15 
Medium Metro 6 7 
Micropolitan 6 9 
Non-Core 6 9 
Small Metro 5 9 




Average Input Levels -Hospitals Grouped by Size, Ownership and Urbanization Levels 
Hospitals Grouped By 
Average Input Levels 
Control Hospitals Target Hospitals 
Beds  Services  Personnel  Total Exp Admissions  Census OpVisits  Births  
Size                 
Small 52 36 247 26570 55 33 271 31482 
Medium 182 51 769 91087 192 46 771 94211 
Large 387 67 2512 413223 349 67 2077 298032 
                  
Ownership Type                 
Investor Owned For-profit 169 44 590 68956 155 41 610 73850 
Non Govt Not-for-profit 226 55 1403 218551 193 52 1115 153722 
Government 100 46 588 71497 119 40 528 63779 
                  
Urbanization Level                 
Large Central Metro 300 60 2337 418258 206 47 1014 144603 
Large Fringe Metro 220 51 979 124440 172 45 793 98063 
Medium Metro 187 51 913 111737 179 45 789 114220 
Micropolitan 161 54 748 90921 164 51 843 103027 
Non-Core 40 34 150 12195 61 30 196 16093 







Average Output Levels -Hospitals Grouped by Size, Ownership and Urbanization Levels 
Hospitals Grouped By 
Average Output Levels 
Control Hospitals Target Hospitals 
Beds  Services  Personnel  Total Exp Admissions  Census OpVisits  Births  
Size                 
Small 1973 25 49859 226 2243 26 46044 289 
Medium 7694 102 100879 1116 8134 115 100268 1107 
Large 20555 305 289318 1734 17430 239 355104 2152 
                  
Ownership Type                 
Investor Owned For-profit 6625 91 71560 814 6580 90 79208 928 
Non Govt Not-for-profit 11853 166 176394 1250 9324 130 187603 1143 
Government 4201 60 92093 539 4253 61 83623 386 
                  
Urbanization Level                 
Large Central Metro 17285 259 305812 2091 9341 140 160767 1432 
Large Fringe Metro 9557 137 108307 1123 8003 107 112197 912 
Medium Metro 9043 116 136697 1104 8790 104 106030 1131 
Micropolitan 7164 99 77110 598 7125 95 124200 656 
Non-Core 966 16 25342 100 1264 30 49803 101 








Cross-sectional Study: Technical Efficiency Scores from DEA and FDH Methods 
 
This section describes the results from the cross-sectional study of the merger hospitals 
from the years 2001-2011. The hospitals that underwent a merger in 2003 and 2004 were 
grouped together so as to increase the size of the dataset. As explained in the previous sections, 
the acquired hospitals that are typically the weaker systems form the focus of the study. 
Efficiency scores are computed using both DEA and FDH methods. Further analysis is 
conducted by grouping the hospitals based on their size (measured by number of staffed beds), 
ownership type and urbanization level. The results from these analyses are described in the 
following sections. 
The mean efficiencies of the pooled dataset (hospitals merged in 2003, 2004 and the 
control hospitals) are estimated for the cross-sectional data for the years 2001-2011 under 
CRS, VRS, input orientation and output orientation specifications. The results are shown in 
Table 7.  
The efficiency scores for the output-oriented models are greater than one since they are 
the reciprocals of their input-oriented counterparts. The mean efficiency score (89%) for the 
CRS input-oriented model can be interpreted as an inefficiency of 11%. On average, under the 
assumption of CRS, the hospitals in the year 2001 could have used 11% fewer inputs to 
produce the same amount of output. Similarly, the average efficiency score (116%) for the VRS 
output-oriented model for the year 2011 indicates that the hospitals could have produced an 
average of 16% more outputs from the available inputs and still remained efficient. It should 




years. This could mean that the mergers did not have a positive impact on the hospitals as was 
expected. However, FDH efficiency measures vary considerably from their DEA counterparts 
and do not display any trends over the years 2001-2011. The average efficiencies of FDH 
models are relatively higher and more hospitals are identified as efficient in this model. The 
FDH scores of both input and output oriented models are given in the Appendix. A graphical 
representation and comparison of average DEA efficiency scores of all the hospitals and their 







Mean Efficiencies from Cross-sectional Study 
 
 
Year CRS IO CRS OO VRS IO VRS OO FDH IO FDH OO 
2001 0.8938 1.1493 0.9208 1.1117 0.9976 1.0005 
2002 0.9246 1.0953 0.9397 1.0763 1.0000 1.0000 
2003 0.8967 1.1348 0.9244 1.0951 0.9990 1.0030 
2004 0.8740 1.2193 0.9136 1.1172 1.0000 1.0009 
2005 0.8518 1.2256 0.8881 1.1440 1.0000 1.0007 
2006 0.8511 1.2360 0.9071 1.1258 0.9998 1.0000 
2007 0.8265 1.2631 0.8924 1.1467 1.0000 1.0000 
2008 0.8169 1.2708 0.8933 1.1475 0.9956 1.0032 
2009 0.8352 1.2497 0.9059 1.1286 0.9995 1.0006 
2010 0.8259 1.2643 0.8904 1.1456 1.0000 1.0000 







Table 8 shows a comparison of efficiency scores for all the hospitals from DEA and 
FDH models for output-oriented models with both CRS and VRS specifications. Hospitals 66 
through 97 represent the control group that did not undergo any mergers. The efficiency scores 
of year 2002 (1+ years before merger) and year 2006 (1+ year after merger) are shown here for 
a pre-post-merger comparison. Since the output-oriented models better describe a hospital 
production setup, I have focused only on the same. The results from other years and model 
specifications are included in the Appendix. 
Since the efficiency scores in Table 8 are based on output-oriented models, higher 
numbers represent higher inefficiency. As expected, FDH models have identified more 
hospitals as efficient (efficiency score = 1) when compared to CRS and VRS models. 
Adopting the FDH method relaxes the convexity assumption in the efficiency frontier 
estimation. While DEA estimates the frontier as a linear convex combination of efficient 
hospitals, FDH compares the hospitals with a real counterpart. Since it is a direct 
comparison with another hospital on the basis of dominance principle, more hospitals are 
identified to be efficient. It also helps hospital management to make changes in the hospital 
by comparing it directly with another hospital on the frontier.  
Table 9 shows a summary of the efficient hospitals for the years 2002 (pre-merger) and 
2006 (post-merger). The percentage numbers indicate the proportion of hospitals that were 
deemed efficient from the DEA and FDH analyses for CRS and VRS model specifications. 
These hospitals form the efficiency frontiers. The pooled dataset (n=97) contains the hospitals 
merged in 2003, 2004 and the control hospitals. All the hospitals were estimated to be efficient 
from the FDH analysis in both the years. The models with the VRS assumption have more 
  
 
      Table 8 
 
Comparison of DEA, FDH Efficiencies of Output-oriented Models from Cross-sectional Study 
 
    2002   2006 
DMU Hospital Names CRS  VRS FDH    CRS  VRS  FDH  
DMU 1 Lakeside Med Center, Belle Glade, FL 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.02 1.00 1.00 
DMU 2 Deaconess Hospital, Oklahoma City, OK 1.18 1.11 1.00   1.29 1.17 1.00 
DMU 3 Christus Spohn Hospital , Alice, TX 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.10 1.09 1.00 
DMU 4 Overland Park Regional Hospital, Overland Park, KS 1.03 1.00 1.00   1.15 1.10 1.00 
DMU 5 Centerpoint Medical Center, Independence, MO 1.18 1.18 1.00   1.06 1.05 1.00 
DMU 6 Nix Healthcare System, San Antonio, TX 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.18 1.14 1.00 
DMU 7 Arroyo Grande Community Hospital, Arroyo Grande, CA 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.15 1.14 1.00 
DMU 8 Altoona Regional Health System, Altoona, PA 1.15 1.13 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 9 Piedmont Mountainside Hospital, Jasper, GA 1.31 1.01 1.00   1.13 1.00 1.00 
DMU 10 Phoenixville Hospital, Phoenixville, PA 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.08 1.05 1.00 
DMU 11 Valley Baptist Med Center, Brownsville, TX 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 12 River Parishes Hospital, Laplace, LA 1.35 1.35 1.00   1.28 1.25 1.00 
DMU 13 Eden Medical Center, Castro Valley, San Leandro, CA 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.28 1.14 1.00 
DMU 14 Carroll County Regional Medical Center, Carrollton, KY 1.27 1.15 1.00   1.59 1.27 1.00 
DMU 15 Chester Regional Medical Center, Chester, SC 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 16 Garfield Medical Center, Monterey Park, CA 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 17 Monterey Park Hospital, Monterey Park, CA 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 18 Whittier Hospital, Whittier, CA 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 19 Montefiore Medical Center - North Division, NY 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.20 1.10 1.00 
DMU 20 Five Rivers Medical Center, Pocahontas, AR 1.36 1.30 1.00   1.91 1.60 1.00 
DMU 21 Sabine Medical Center, Many, LA 1.00 1.00 1.00   1.00 1.00 1.00 





(continued on the following page) 
  
 
           2002    2006 
  DMU  Hospital Names  CRS  VRS  FDH  CRS  VRS    FDH   
 
DMU 49 Woodward Regional Hospital, Woodward, OK 1.54 1.52 1.00 1.66 1.60 1.00 
DMU 50 Southwest Alabama Med Center, Thomasville, AL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.23 1.00 1.00 
DMU 51 Memorial Medical Center Inc., Las Cruces, NM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.06 1.00 
DMU 52 Spectrum Health-United Memorial, Greenville, MI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 53 Vista Hospital of Dallas, Garland, TX 1.02 1.00 1.00 4.69 1.00 1.00 
DMU 54 Pacifica Hospital of the Valley, Los Angeles, CA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 55 French Hospital Medical Center, San Louis Obispo,  CA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.17 1.16 1.00 
DMU 56 Metrowest Medical Center, Framingham, MA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.11 1.00 1.00 
DMU 57 St. Vincent Indianapolis Hospital, Indianapolis, IN 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 58 Baptist Health South Florida Doctors Hospital, Coral Gables, FL 1.22 1.16 1.00 1.26 1.24 1.00 
DMU 59 University Medical Center, Lebanon, TN 1.23 1.23 1.00 1.42 1.35 1.00 
DMU 60 Poplar Bluff Regional Medical Center, Poplar Bluff, MO 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 61 Twin Rivers Regional Medical Center, Kennett, MO 1.10 1.07 1.00 1.06 1.03 1.00 
DMU 62 White County Medical Center, Searcy, AR 1.23 1.19 1.00 1.29 1.15 1.00 
DMU 63 National Park Medical Center, Hot Springs, AR 1.26 1.24 1.00 1.52 1.51 1.00 
DMU 64 NEA Baptist Memorial Hospital, Jonesboro, AR 1.23 1.23 1.00 1.08 1.07 1.00 
DMU 65 Saint Mary’s Regional Medical Center, Russellville, AR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.21 1.21 1.00 
DMU 66 Berrien County Hospital, Nashville, GA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 67 Corona Regional Medical Center, Corona, CA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 68 San Joaquin General Hospital, French Camp, CA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 69 Blake Medical Center, Bradenton, FL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 70 Phoebe North/Palmyra Med Centers, Albany, GA 1.30 1.29 1.00 1.52 1.49 1.00 
DMU 71 Saint Anthony Hospital, Chicago, IL 1.06 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 72 Kishwaukee Community Hospital, DeKalb, IL 1.06 1.05 1.00 1.19 1.15 1.00 
DMU 73 Swedish American Hospital, Rockford, IL 1.25 1.16 1.00 1.37 1.19 1.00 





(Table 8 continued) 
 





2002   2006 
  DMU  Hospital Names  CRS    VRS    FDH  CRS    VRS    FDH   
DMU 75 Maryland General Hospital, Baltimore, MD 1.20 1.18 1.00 1.31 1.23 1.00 
DMU 76 Southern Maryland Hospital Center, Clinton, MD 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.00 
DMU 77 Alpena Regional Medical Center, Alpena, MI 1.25 1.25 1.00 1.49 1.48 1.00 
DMU 78 Citizens Memorial Hospital, Bolivar, MO 1.21 1.18 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 79 Missouri Southern Healthcare, Dexter, MO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.03 1.00 
DMU 80 St, James Healthcare, Butte, MT 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.11 1.09 1.00 
DMU 81 Barrett Hospital & Healthcare, Dillon, MT 1.24 1.00 1.00 1.50 1.05 1.00 
DMU 82 Box Butte Gen Hospital, Alliance, NE 1.14 1.12 1.00 1.32 1.09 1.00 
DMU 83 Memorial Community Health Hospital, Aurora, NE 1.13 1.10 1.00 1.21 1.15 1.00 
DMU 84 Stony Lodge Hospital, Ossining, NY 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 85 Willamette Valley Medical Center, McMinnville, OR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13 1.13 1.00 
DMU 86 Wallowa Memorial Hospital, Enterprise, OR 1.09 1.00 1.00 1.08 1.00 1.00 
DMU 87 Geisinger HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital, Danville, PA 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.31 1.03 1.00 
DMU 88 Abilene Regional Medical Center, Abilene, TX 1.12 1.10 1.00 1.26 1.25 1.00 
DMU 89 Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, Allen, TX 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
DMU 90 Care Regional Med Center, Aransas Pass, TX 1.12 1.11 1.00 1.61 1.44 1.00 
DMU 91 Johnston Memorial Hospital, Abingdon, VA 1.30 1.28 1.00 1.58 1.53 1.00 
DMU 92 Capital Medical Center, Olympia, WA 1.18 1.16 1.00 1.55 1.54 1.00 
DMU 93 Toppenish Community Hospital, Toppenish, WA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.05 1.00 1.00 
DMU 94 St. Mary’s Hospital, Madison, WI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.00 1.00 
DMU 95 Saint Joseph’s Hospital, Marshfield, WI 1.10 1.03 1.00 1.10 1.05 1.00 
DMU 96 Evanston Regional Hospital, Evanston, WY 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.28 1.18 1.00 









efficient hospitals as compared to those from CRS models. In addition, the percentage of 




Percentage of Efficient Hospitals 
    2002     2006   
  CRS VRS FDH CRS VRS FDH 
n=97(pooled) 0.49 0.59 1.00 0.26 0.43 1.00 
  n=65(no control)   0.55 0.62 1.00 0.26 0.45 1.00 
 
 
Grouped by Size 
 
The hospitals were grouped as small (< 100 beds), medium (100-300 beds) and large 
(>300 beds) based on their number of staffed beds. This grouping was done post-DEA analysis. 
The sample set consists of 34 small hospitals, 47 medium hospitals and 16 large hospitals. 
Larger hospitals demonstrated higher average efficiency scores and were followed by medium 
and small hospitals. Figure 8 demonstrates the average inefficiency scores for a VRS output-
oriented model. On average, smaller hospitals are more inefficient compared to medium and 
large hospitals. This is an indication of larger hospitals having a better control of outputs than 
medium and smaller hospitals, thus increasing their efficiency. But there is no clear trend 























The average efficiency decreases after the merger year and the trend is more prominent 
in the case of large hospitals. This supports the argument that mergers do not necessarily 
increase the technical efficiencies. Farrell’s efficiency score from an output-oriented model is 
the reciprocal of its input-oriented measure. A comparison by sizes of average DEA efficiency 
scores of all the hospitals for both CRS and VRS models is shown in the Appendix. 
Grouped by Ownership Type 
 
In order to study the effect of ownership type on merged hospitals, the cross-sectional 
data is grouped into three types: not-for-profit, for-profit, and government hospitals, based on 
the guidelines by the AHA. Table 10 classifies the hospital ownership types and the type of 
hospitals included in these classifications. 
Table 10 
 
AHA Classification of Hospitals under Various Ownership Types 
 
 
Ownership Type Hospitals Included 
Government, non-federal  State, County, City, City-county, Hospital District 
Non-government Not-for-profit Church operated, Other 




The sample consists of 41 for-profit, 34 not-for-profit and 12 government hospitals. 
Under CRS assumptions, government hospitals demonstrate the least average efficiency scores 
compared to those of for-profit and non-government not-for-profit hospitals, whereas there is no 
clear indication of the same in the case of a VRS model. A comparison by various ownership 























Grouped by Urbanization Levels 
 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services–National Center for Health 
Statistics (NCHS) has classified the counties into 6 urbanization levels, as shown in Table 11. 
Table 11 
NCHS 2013 Urban-rural Classification Scheme for Counties 
Urbanization Level Classification Rules 
Metropolitan Counties   
Large Central Metro Counties in MSAs of 1 million or more population that: 1) Contain 
the entire population of the largest principal city of the MSA, or 2) 
Have their entire population contained in the largest principal city 
of the MSA, or 3) Contain at least 250,000 inhabitants of any 
principal city of the MSA 
Large Fringe Metro Counties in MSAs of 1 million or more population that did not 
qualify as large central metro counties 
Medium Metro Counties in MSAs of populations of 250,000–999,999 
Small Metro Counties in MSAs of populations less than 250,000 
    
Nonmetropolitan 
Counties   
Micropolitan Counties in micropolitan statistical areas 
Noncore Nonmetropolitan counties that did not qualify as micropolitan 
 
 The average efficiencies of Medium Metro (MM), Large Fringe Metro (LFM) and 
Large Central Metro (LCM) hospitals are greater than those of the hospitals in the other 
urbanization levels. There is a downward trend in the average efficiency scores over the 
years 2001-2011 in the input-oriented models. Figure 10 represents the inefficiency 
scores of hospitals for a VRS output-oriented model. As in all the other output-oriented 
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As expected, small metro hospitals and the rural hospitals (Micro and Non-Core) appear 
to be least efficient when compared to other urban hospitals’ (Large Fringe, Central and 
Medium Metro) efficiencies of hospitals for all model specifications. An explanation is that rural 
hospitals will be having less control of their outputs as opposed to their urban counterparts, 
especially due to their location, possible lack of technology, and smaller population. 
Non-parametric ANOVA Tests 
 
The results from both Kruskal-Wallis tests and Mann-Whitney U test indicate that 
there is no significant difference between the means of the merger group and the control 
group of hospitals in the case of VRS models of both input and output orientations. The 
results from the CRS model indicated otherwise. A similar pattern was observed between the 
hospitals that were merged in 2003 and the control group. 
Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
 
The difference-in-difference (DD) estimators were computed for the hospitals merged in 
2004 using the efficiency scores from the pre-merger year 2003 and post-merger year 2005. 
Under the assumption that the hospitals were aware of the upcoming merger in the year 2003, 





DD Estimators at Alpha = 0.05 
Model CRS IO CRS OO VRS IO VRS OO 
DD -0.0069 0.0019 0.0015 -0.0219 
p-value 0.8655 0.9741 0.9666 0.6741 
 
The DD estimators denote the average treatment effect of the efficiency scores in the 
post-merger period. It can also be interpreted as the difference in efficiency scores due to the 
merger in 2003 (pre-merger period) compared to 2005 (post-merger period). This estimation did 
not control for any other factors that may affect the efficiency scores. None of the results were 
statistically significant; hence we can conclude that mergers did not have any effect on the 
efficiency scores of these hospitals. 
Tobit Regression Results 
 
The second-stage Tobit model estimation results are presented in Table 13. The 
efficiency scores generated from VRS output oriented model are corrected for possible bias in the 
second stage and the normalized inefficiency scores are regressed against the right hand side 
variables as shown in equation (1). The literature suggests that a VRS output model is more 
appropriate for this analysis, as the hospitals have more control of their outputs as compared 





Tobit Model Estimates for VRS Output-Oriented Model 
 
Parameter Estimate SE t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 0.3281 0.0117 28.0100 <.0001 
BEDS -0.0003 0.0000 -10.4500 <.0001 
MERGER 0.0093 0.0078 1.1900 0.2322 
GOVT -0.0044 0.0124 -0.3600 0.7204 
IOFP 0.0177 0.0078 2.2800 0.0225 
LCM -0.0469 0.0125 -3.7600 0.0002 
LFM -0.0355 0.0121 -2.9300 0.0034 
MM -0.0421 0.0130 -3.2400 0.0012 
SM 0.0095 0.0132 0.7200 0.4718 
MICRO 0.0174 0.0127 1.3700 0.1713 





Since the dependent variable is inefficiency, a positive value of the estimate indicates a 
decrease in efficiency. The coefficients of the dummy variables can be interpreted as 
percentage shifts in the inefficiency scores. Five of the nine variables are statistically 
significant and have p-values less than 0.05. The negative coefficient of the variable Beds 
indicates that larger hospitals will have higher efficiencies. The dummy variable denoting the 
merger effect is not statistically significant and confirms our prior findings on the post-merger 
effect. An investor-owned for-profit (IOFP) hospital has a negative effect on the efficiency of 
the hospital, whereas government (GOVT) hospitals do not affect the efficiency scores. The 




correlated with the efficiency whereas SM and Micro, which are more rural, are associated with 
lower efficiency scores.  
Interaction Effects 
 
Additional interaction effects are tested to examine if the merger effects on inefficiency 
are affected by other exogenous variables (ownership types, urbanization levels). These 
interaction terms help us understand the relationship between the merger and other exogenous 
factors in the model.  In this problem, these interactions can be specifically used to test the 
hypothesis that the relationship between the effect of size, hospital ownership type and 
urbanization level would be different if the hospital undergoes a merger than that of a control 
hospital that has never undergone a merger. The Tobit regression model used in this analysis 
is given below. 
 
 
Inefficiency = α + β1 Beds + β2 Merger + [β3 Govt + β4 IOFP] + [β5 LCM + β6 LFM + 
β7MM + β8 SM + β9 Micro] + [β10 Beds*Merger + β11 Govt*Merger + β12 IOFP*Merger + 
β13 LCM*Merger + β14 Micro*Merger + + β15 Govt*Beds + β16 Govt*Beds*Merger + β17 
Micro*Beds + β18 Micro*Beds*Merger] (9)  
 
 The coefficients β10 - β18 represent the effect of interaction terms. The results from the 
model are shown in Table 14. The effect of merger on the inefficiency depends on the values of 
the β estimates of the interaction terms and the size/urbanization level/ownership types. Among 
the interaction terms, only (Micro*Merger), denoted by the variable MICRO_M, is statistically 
significant at α =0.05.  The interpretation is as follows. For two hospitals in micropolitan 
statistical areas, a hospital that has undergone a merger would be expected to have a higher 




any merger. The results suggest that a merger’s effect on the hospitals in a Micropolitan 
statistical area is more pronounced than that in other core based statistical areas. 
 
Table 14 
Interaction Results in a VRS Output-Oriented Model 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard Error t Value Pr > |t| 
Intercept 1.0 0.5109 0.0420 12.1700 <.0001 
BEDS 1.0 -0.0006 0.0002 -4.1400 <.0001 
MERGER 1.0 0.0606 0.0459 1.3200 0.1874 
GOVT 1.0 0.0043 0.0452 0.0900 0.9249 
IOFP 1.0 0.0778 0.0355 2.1900 0.0283 
LCM 1.0 -0.0914 0.0578 -1.5800 0.1135 
LFM 1.0 -0.1044 0.0301 -3.4700 0.0005 
MM 1.0 -0.0954 0.0329 -2.9000 0.0037 
SM 1.0 0.0079 0.0323 0.2400 0.8068 
MICRO 1.0 0.1118 0.0450 2.4800 0.013 
BEDS_M 1.0 0.0000 0.0002 0.0900 0.9293 
GOVT_M 1.0 0.0169 0.0635 0.2700 0.7902 
IOFP_M 1.0 -0.0271 0.0420 -0.6500 0.5185 
LCM_M 1.0 -0.0141 0.0586 -0.2400 0.8093 
MICRO_M 1.0 -0.1446 0.0506 -2.8600 0.0043 
_Sigma 1.0 0.2710 0.0059 46.1900 <.0001 
 
 
The Office of Management and Budget classifies a Micropolitan area with a population 
between 10,000 and 50,000. One reason for the higher impact on these areas could be the lack of 
competition among hospitals. These areas typically have a lower density of hospitals. Hospital 
mergers in such areas often lead to monopolies that in turn result in higher healthcare costs and 





While this study has proved that horizontal mergers in hospitals lead to inefficiency, the 
effect is more pronounced in Micropolitan areas. No studies in the literature have shown a direct 












This paper uses non-parametric DEA and FDH methods to analyze the pre- and post- 
performance of merged hospitals. This study focuses only on the target (acquired) hospital, 
unlike previous studies. The main conclusion from the study is that we cannot justify all 
hospital mergers on grounds of efficiency gains. Although hospitals merge with the post- 
merger expectations of higher efficiency, both cross-sectional and panel data analysis of the 
hospitals suggest that some hospitals had a decrease in efficiency scores in the years following 
the merger. The study uses a larger time span of 7 years after the merger so as to capture all the 
changes arising from the merger. There are reports that some of the hospitals shut down a 
couple of years after the merger due to financial distress. Previous literature suggests potential 
gains from mergers, but this study could not confirm these. In fact, since the control group 
(hospitals that did not undergo any mergers) results had very similar trends as those of hospitals 
that merged, it can be concluded that the changes in efficiency cannot necessarily be attributed 
to the mergers. Additional analysis using DD and non-parametric ANOVA tests also confirmed 
these findings. 
From the cross-sectional comparative study between hospitals with different ownership 
types, it is interesting to note that for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals follow a similar trend in 




objectives. Similarly, the comparative study between hospitals of various sizes revealed that the 
large hospitals were more efficient than medium and small hospitals for an input-oriented 
model. The trends reversed for an output-oriented model.  In addition, the hospitals were 
grouped based on their urbanization levels of their respective counties. The results showed that 
the hospitals located in the more urbanized counties were more efficient than their rural 
counterparts. In addition, the two-stage DEA using Tobit regression using the panel data from 
the years 2001-2011 confirmed that mergers as such have not contributed to the change in 
efficiency scores in the pre- or post-merger periods. 
The results from DEA and FDH estimation procedures were significantly different. 
Because the convexity assumption is relaxed in the FDH analysis, most of the hospitals were 
identified as efficient hospitals. Hence most of these hospitals do not have to change anything to 
improve their efficiency.  In the absence of the convexity assumption, we can conclude that all 
the hospitals are efficient in some way and cannot reject the null hypothesis that mergers impact 
hospital efficiencies.  Since the efficiency scores are relative to the best hospitals in the sample, 
small micropolitan hospitals may look inefficient when compared to large centralized hospitals. 
A combination of analysis from both DEA and FDH methods can be useful to make managerial 
decisions regarding hospital resource allocations. While FDH analysis helps to do comparisons 
with real efficient hospitals rather than a convex combination of efficient hospitals, DEA 
analysis helps set goals for individual hospitals to improve their efficiency either by reducing 
their inputs or increasing their outputs, provided they are feasible. 
As discussed above, even though mergers were expected to streamline processes and 




the contrary. There were an explosion of mergers in the 90s. However, in the early to mid- 
2000s, the number of mergers decreased and stabilized. As I have described in the previous 
sections, mergers cause monopoly and decrease competition, which is contrary to the 
American marketplace mindset. This leads to less competition and lower efficiency. 
The introduction of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which was passed into law by the 
Obama Administration in October 2010 might change this scenario. According to the ACA, the 
number of procedures is not the deciding factor for doctors’ pay; instead, it is the quality of care 
that is considered to be most important. For example, the ACA expects that a doctor gives the 
highest quality of care, which results in reduced readmission. This can increase the quality of 
hospitals as well as their efficiency. It will be interesting to see if there is an uptick in the 
mergers and acquisitions in the aftermath of the ACA. Hospitals have a responsibility under the 
ACA to be “quality driven or more efficient.” Will hospitals try to reduce their costs by mergers 
and maintain their efficiency as dictated by the ACA? We can already see an increase in the 
mergers and acquisition of hospitals since ACA was signed into law, as shown in Figure 11 
(adapted from Irving Levin Associates). 
As seen in Figure 11, the amount of hospital consolidations increased after ACA became 
law. It will be interesting to do the same analysis using DEA, FDH and Tobit regression on the 
mergers done after the ACA was implemented. 
In addition, future work can also be done on micropolitian statistical areas which are 
closer to big cities such as Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and Atlanta and compared to 
other micropolitian statistical areas to see if the increased inefficiency in these areas changes 






Some of the limitations of this study include the exclusion of some variables that may 
have affected the efficiency score. As in some other DEA studies, this work does not include 
any quality variables associated with hospitals. Hence it does not offer any insight into the 
hospital quality or patient satisfaction levels. Inclusion of these variables would make the study 































Although the business models of hospitals differ from those of airline, banking and retail 
industries, we can apply the proposed methods to study the efficiency changes associated with 
mergers in these industries.   While all these organizations use the same concepts of demand and 




could be attributed to the reforms that are happening in the industry and the organization’s efforts 
to catch up in a short time.  There were observed differences in efficiencies even within the   
hospital types.  For example,  urban hospitals tend to be more efficient than their rural 
counterparts.   We can possibly attribute these differences in constraints - rural hospitals are 
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Hospital Names and Identification 
 
DMU Number Hospital Names 
DMU 1 Lakeside Med Center, Belle Glade, FL 
DMU 2 Deaconness Hospital, Oklahoma City, OK 
DMU 3 Christus Spohn Hospital , Alice, TX 
DMU 4 Overland Park Regional Hospital, Overland Park, KS 
DMU 5 Centerpoint Medical Center, Independence, MO 
DMU 6 Nix Healthcare System, San Antonio, TX 
DMU 7 Arroyo Grande Community Hospital, Arroyo Grande, CA 
DMU 8 Altoona Regional Health System, Altoona, PA 
DMU 9 Piedmont Mountainside Hospital, Jasper, GA 
DMU 10 Phoenixville Hospital, Phoenixville, PA 
DMU 11 Valley Baptist Med Center, Brownsville, TX 
DMU 12 River Parishes Hospital, LaPlace, LA 
DMU 13 Eden Medical Center, Castro Valley, San Leandro, CA 
DMU 14 Carrol CountyRegional Medical Center, Carrollton, KY 
DMU 15 Chester Regional Medical Center, Chester, SC 
DMU 16 Garfield Medical Center, Monterey Park, CA 
DMU 17 Monterey Park Hospital, Monterey Park, CA 
DMU 18 Whittier Hospital, Whittier, CA 
DMU 19 Montefiore Medical Center - North Division, NY 
DMU 20 Five Rivers Medical Center, Pocahontas, AR 
DMU 21 Sabine Medical Center, Many, LA 
DMU 22 East Jefferson General Hospital, Metairie, LA 
DMU 23 Coastal Communities Hospital, Santa Ana, CA 
DMU 24 Dukes Memorial Hospital, Peru, IN 
DMU 25 Saint Vincent Hospital, Worcester, MA 
DMU 26 Metro West Medical Center, Framingham, MA 
DMU 27 De Queen Regional Medical Center, DeQueen, AR 
DMU 28 Forest Park Community  Hospital , St.Louis, MO 
DMU 29 St. Alexius Hospital Broadway Campus, St.Louis, MO 
DMU 30 UK Healthcare Good Samaritan Hospital, Lexington, KY 
DMU 31 Parkview Lagrange Hospital, LaGrange, IN 
DMU 32 Southside Regional Medical Center, Petersburg, VA 
 







(Table 15 continued) 
 
DMU Number Hospital Names 
DMU 33 Yakima Regional Medical & Heart Center, Yakima, WA 
DMU 34 Toppenish Community Hospital, Toppenish, WA 
DMU 35 Laredo Medical Center, Laredo, TX 
DMU 36 Mercy Hospital & Medical Center, Chicago, IL 
DMU 37 Paris Regional Medical Center, Paris, TX 
DMU 38 Leesburg Regional Medical Center, Leesburg, FL 
DMU 39 USC/Norris Cancer Hospital, Los Angeles, CA 
DMU 40 Corona Regional Medical Center, Corona, CA 
DMU 41 Arroyo Grande Community Hospital, Arroyo Grande, CA 
DMU 42 Walton Regional Medical Center, Monroe, GA 
DMU 43 Franciscan St.Elizabeth Health-Lafayette Central, Lafayette, IN 
DMU 44 Springview Hospital, Lebanon, KY 
DMU 45 Essentia Health, Fargo, ND 
DMU 46 McKenzie-Williamette Hospital, Springfield, OR 
DMU 47 Excela Latrobe Area Hospital, Latrobe, PA 
DMU 48 Unity Hospital, Rochester, NY 
DMU 49 Woodward Regional Hospital, Woodward, OK 
DMU 50 Southwest Alabama Med Center, Thomasville, AL 
DMU 51 Memorial Medical Center Inc, Las Cruces, NM 
DMU 52 Spectrum Health-United Memorial, Greenville, MI 
DMU 53 Vista Hospital of Dallas, Garland, TX 
DMU 54 Pacifica Hospital of the Valley, Los Angeles, CA 
DMU 55 French Hospital Medical Center, San Louis Obispo,  CA 
DMU 56 Metrowest Medical Center, Framingham, MA 
DMU 57 St. Vincent Indianapolis Hosp, Indianapolis, IN 
DMU 58  Baptist Health South Florida Doctors Hospital, Coral Gables, FL 
DMU 59 University Medical Center, Lebanon, TN 
DMU 60 Poplar Bluff Reg Medical Center, Poplar Bluff, MO 
DMU 61 Twin Rivers Regional Medical Center, Kennett, MO 
DMU 62 White County Medical Center, Searcy, AR 
DMU 63 National Park Medical Center, Hot Springs, AR 
DMU 64 NEA Baptist Memorial Hospital, Jonesboro, AR 





(Table 15 continued) 
 
DMU Number Hospital Names 
DMU 65 Saint Marys Regional Medical Center, Russellville, AR 
DMU 66 Berrien County Hospital, Nashville, GA 
DMU 67 Corona Regional Medical Center, Corona, CA 
DMU 68 San Joaquin General Hospital, Frenchcamp, CA 
DMU 69 Blake Medical Center, Bradenton, FL 
DMU 70 Phoebe North/Palmyra Med Centers, Albany, GA 
DMU 71 Saint Anthony Hospital, Chicago, IL 
DMU 72 Kishwaukee Community Hospital, Dekalb, IL 
DMU 73 Swedish American Hospital, Rockford, IL 
DMU 74 Comanche County Hospital, Coldwater, KS 
DMU 75 Maryland General Hospital, Baltimore, MD 
DMU 76 Southern Maryland Hosp Center, Clinton, MD 
DMU 77 Alpena Regional Medical Center, Alpena, MI 
DMU 78 Citizens Memorial Hospital, Bolivar, MO 
DMU 79 Missouri Southern Helathcare, Dexter, MO 
DMU 80 St, James Healthcare, Butte, MT 
DMU 81 Barrett Hospital & Healthcare, Dillon, MT 
DMU 82 Box Butte Gen Hosp, Alliance, NE 
DMU 83 Memorial Community Health Hospital, Aurora, NE 
DMU 84 Stony Lodge Hospital, Ossining, NY 
DMU 85 Willamette Valley Medical Center, McMinnville, OR 
DMU 86 Wallowa Memorial Hospital, Enterprise, OR 
DMU 87 Geisinger Healthsouth Rehabilitation Hospital, Danville, PA 
DMU 88 Abilene Regional Medical Center, Abilene, TX 
DMU 89 Texas Health Presbyterian Hospital, Allen, TX 
DMU 90 Care Regional Med Center, Aransas Pass, TX 
DMU 91 Johnston Memorial Hospital, Abingdon, VA 
DMU 92 Capital Medical Center, Olympia, WA 
DMU 93 Toppenish Community Hospital, Toppennish, WA 
DMU 94 St. Marys Hospital, Madison, WI 
DMU 95 Saint Josephs Hospital, Marshfield, WI 
DMU 96 Evanston Regional Hospital, Evanston, WY 








                           DEA Efficiency Scores - CRS Input-Oriented Model 
 
CRS IO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 2 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 3 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DMU 4 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 
DMU 5 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 
DMU 6 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 
DMU 7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
DMU 8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
DMU 9 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 
DMU 10 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 
DMU 11 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 
DMU 12 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 
DMU 13 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 
DMU 14 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 
DMU 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 16 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 
DMU 17 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 18 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 19 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 20 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 
DMU 21 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 
DMU 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 23 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 24 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 
DMU 25 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 26 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 27 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0 
DMU 28 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 
DMU 29 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 
DMU 30 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 
DMU 31 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 32 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.7 
DMU 33 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 34 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 
 





 (Table 16 continued) 
 
CRS IO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 35 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 36 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DMU 37 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 
DMU 38 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 
DMU 39 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.7 
DMU 40 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 
DMU 41 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
DMU 42 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 
DMU 43 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 
DMU 44 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
DMU 45 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.6 
DMU 46 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 47 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 
DMU 48 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 49 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 
DMU 50 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 
DMU 51 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 
DMU 52 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 
DMU 53 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.5 
DMU 54 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 55 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DMU 56 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 57 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 
DMU 58 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 
DMU 59 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 
DMU 60 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DMU 61 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 
DMU 62 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
DMU 63 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
DMU 64 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 
DMU 65 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 
DMU 66 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.0 
 
 





(Table 16 continued) 
 
CRS IO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 67 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 69 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 70 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 71 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 
DMU 72 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
DMU 73 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 74 0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 
DMU 75 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 
DMU 76 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 
DMU 77 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 78 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 79 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 80 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 
DMU 81 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 
DMU 82 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
DMU 83 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
DMU 84 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 85 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 
DMU 86 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.7 
DMU 87 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 
DMU 88 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 89 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 
DMU 90 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.6 
DMU 91 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 
DMU 92 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 93 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 94 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 95 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 
DMU 96 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 









DEA Efficiency Scores - CRS Output-Oriented Model 
 
CRS OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.5 
DMU 3 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 
DMU 4 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 
DMU 5 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 
DMU 6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 
DMU 7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
DMU 8 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
DMU 9 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.2 1.2 
DMU 10 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 
DMU 11 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 
DMU 12 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.6 
DMU 13 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 
DMU 14 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 
DMU 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 16 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 
DMU 17 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 18 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 19 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 20 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.7 2.0 
DMU 21 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 
DMU 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.4 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 
DMU 23 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 24 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.4 
DMU 25 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 
DMU 26 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 
DMU 27 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.0 1.0 
DMU 28 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 
DMU 29 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 
DMU 30 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
DMU 31 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 
DMU 31 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.4 
DMU 32 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 
DMU 33 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 34 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
  





(Table 17 continued) 
 
CRS OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 35 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
DMU 36 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 
DMU 37 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 
DMU 38 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.3 1.7 1.7 1.3 
DMU 39 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 
DMU 40 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
DMU 41 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
DMU 42 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.1 1.1 
DMU 43 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.6 
DMU 44 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.7 
DMU 45 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 
DMU 46 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 
DMU 47 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 48 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.8 
DMU 49 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 
DMU 50 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 
DMU 51 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 
DMU 52 1.2 1.0 1.9 7.1 4.9 4.7 3.8 2.3 4.0 3.3 2.2 
DMU 53 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 54 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 
DMU 55 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 
DMU 56 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 
DMU 57 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.6 
DMU 58 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.0 
DMU 59 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 
DMU 60 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 
DMU 61 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.5 
DMU 62 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.6 
DMU 63 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4 
DMU 64 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
DMU 65 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.5 1.3 1.1 1.0 
DMU 66 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 
 
 





(Table 17 continued) 
CRS OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 67 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 
DMU 68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 69 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 
DMU 70 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4 
DMU 71 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 
DMU 72 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 
DMU 73 1.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 2.1 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.6 2.2 
DMU 74 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.5 
DMU 75 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 
DMU 76 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.3 
DMU 77 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 78 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 79 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 
DMU 80 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.7 1.9 
DMU 81 1.9 1.1 1.0 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.8 
DMU 82 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 
DMU 83 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 84 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 
DMU 85 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.5 1.5 
DMU 86 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 
DMU 87 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 
DMU 88 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 
DMU 89 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.6 
DMU 90 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 
DMU 91 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 
DMU 92 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 93 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 94 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 
DMU 95 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.7 
DMU 96 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 










DEA Efficiency Scores - VRS Input-Oriented Model 
 
VRS IO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 2 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.7 
DMU 3 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 
DMU 4 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 5 0.9 0.8 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DMU 7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
DMU 8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
DMU 9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 
DMU 10 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 
DMU 11 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 12 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.7 
DMU 13 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 
DMU 14 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 
DMU 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 16 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 17 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 18 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 19 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 20 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 21 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
DMU 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 
DMU 23 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 24 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 25 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 26 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 27 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 
DMU 28 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 
DMU 29 0.7 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 
DMU 30 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 
DMU 31 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
DMU 32 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DMU 33 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 34 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 35 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 





(Table 18 continued) 
 
VRS IO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 36 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 37 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.8 
DMU 38 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
DMU 39 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.8 
DMU 40 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 41 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
DMU 42 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DMU 43 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 
DMU 44 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 45 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.6 
DMU 46 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 47 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 
DMU 48 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 49 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.6 
DMU 50 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 51 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 
DMU 52 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.0 
DMU 53 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 54 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 55 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 56 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 57 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 
DMU 58 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.6 
DMU 59 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 
DMU 60 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 
DMU 61 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 
DMU 62 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 
DMU 63 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 
DMU 64 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 










(Table 18 continued) 
 
VRS IO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 66 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 67 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 69 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 70 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 71 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 
DMU 72 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
DMU 73 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 
DMU 74 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 75 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 
DMU 76 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 77 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
DMU 78 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 79 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 80 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 
DMU 81 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DMU 82 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 
DMU 83 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 
DMU 84 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 85 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 
DMU 86 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 
DMU 87 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 
DMU 88 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 
DMU 89 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 90 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.7 
DMU 91 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 
DMU 92 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
DMU 93 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 94 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 95 0.8 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 96 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 








DEA Efficiency Scores - VRS Output-Oriented Model 
 
VRS OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.3 
DMU 3 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
DMU 4 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 5 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 
DMU 6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
DMU 7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 
DMU 8 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 9 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.2 
DMU 10 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 
DMU 11 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 12 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.6 
DMU 13 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 
DMU 14 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 
DMU 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 16 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 17 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 18 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 19 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 20 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.9 
DMU 21 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
DMU 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 
DMU 23 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 24 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 25 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 26 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 27 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 
DMU 28 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 
DMU 29 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3 
DMU 30 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
DMU 31 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 
DMU 32 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 
DMU 33 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.4 
DMU 34 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 35 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 





(Table 19 continued) 
 
VRS OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 36 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 37 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 
DMU 38 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
DMU 39 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.3 
DMU 40 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 41 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 
DMU 42 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 
DMU 43 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 
DMU 44 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 
DMU 45 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.5 
DMU 46 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.4 
DMU 47 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 
DMU 48 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 49 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.8 
DMU 50 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 51 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 
DMU 52 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 
DMU 53 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 
DMU 54 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 55 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 
DMU 56 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 57 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 
DMU 58 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 
DMU 59 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 
DMU 60 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 
DMU 61 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 
DMU 62 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 
DMU 63 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 
DMU 64 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.3 










(Table 19 continued) 
 
VRS OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 66 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 67 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 
DMU 68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 69 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 70 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.3 
DMU 71 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.3 
DMU 72 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
DMU 73 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 
DMU 74 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 75 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 
DMU 76 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 77 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.3 
DMU 78 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 79 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 80 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 
DMU 81 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 
DMU 82 1.7 1.1 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 
DMU 83 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 
DMU 84 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 85 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 
DMU 86 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.4 
DMU 87 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 
DMU 88 1.3 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
DMU 89 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 90 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.4 1.5 
DMU 91 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 
DMU 92 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 
DMU 93 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 94 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 95 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 96 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.6 









FDH Efficiency Scores - Input-Oriented Model 
 
FDH OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 5 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 10 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 11 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 12 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 13 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 14 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 16 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 17 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 18 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 19 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 20 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 21 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 23 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 24 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 25 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 26 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 27 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 28 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 29 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 30 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 31 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 32 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 33 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 34 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 35 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 






(Table 20 continued) 
 
FDH OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 36 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 37 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 38 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 39 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 
DMU 40 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 41 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 42 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 43 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 44 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 45 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.7 
DMU 46 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 47 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 48 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 49 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 50 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 51 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 52 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 53 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 54 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 55 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 56 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 57 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 58 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 59 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 60 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 61 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 62 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 63 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 64 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 










(Table 20 continued) 
 
FDH OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 66 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 67 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 69 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 70 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 71 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 72 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 73 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 74 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 75 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 76 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 77 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 78 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 79 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 80 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 81 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 82 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 83 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 84 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 85 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 86 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 87 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 88 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 89 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 90 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 91 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 92 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 93 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 94 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 95 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 96 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 










FDH Efficiency Scores - Output-Oriented Model 
 
FDH OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 5 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 10 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 11 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 12 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 13 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 14 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 16 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 17 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 18 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 19 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 20 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 21 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 22 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 23 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 24 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 25 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 26 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 27 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 28 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 29 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 30 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 31 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 32 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 33 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 34 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 35 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 






(Table 21 continued) 
 
FDH OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 36 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 37 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 38 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 39 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 
DMU 40 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 41 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 42 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 43 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 44 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 45 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 
DMU 46 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 47 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 48 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 49 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 50 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 51 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 52 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 53 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 54 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 55 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 56 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 57 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 58 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 59 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 60 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 61 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 62 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 63 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 64 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 











(Table 21 continued) 
 
FDH OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
DMU 66 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 67 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 68 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 69 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 70 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 71 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 72 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 73 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 74 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 75 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 76 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 77 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 78 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 79 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 80 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 81 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 82 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 83 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 84 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 85 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 86 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 87 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 88 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 89 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 90 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 91 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 92 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 93 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 94 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 95 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
DMU 96 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 













Average DEA Efficiency Scores - CRS Input-Oriented Model 
 
CRS-IO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
M2004_Avg 0.89 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.85 
M2003_Avg 0.91 0.93 0.88 0.85 0.85 0.84 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.82 0.81 





























Average DEA Efficiency Scores - CRS Output-Oriented Model 
 
CRS-OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
M2004_Avg 1.16 1.10 1.12 1.14 1.19 1.16 1.26 1.25 1.20 1.19 1.22 
M2003_Avg 1.12 1.09 1.16 1.34 1.28 1.30 1.28 1.30 1.30 1.29 1.28 




















Average DEA Efficiency Scores - VRS Input-Oriented Model 
 
VRS-IO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
M2004_Avg 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.94 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.91 
M2003_Avg 0.93 0.94 0.91 0.90 0.88 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.87 0.87 






















Average DEA Efficiency Scores - VRS Output-Oriented Model 
 
VRS-OO 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
M2004_Avg 1.13 1.07 1.09 1.11 1.14 1.09 1.15 1.14 1.10 1.10 1.13 
M2003_Avg 1.10 1.08 1.11 1.13 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.17 1.16 1.16 1.17 
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